What Does the International Court Have To Do with the Assassination of Hezbollah Leaders?

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The courtroom of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon in Leidschendam, Netherlands. March 25, 2010. (Photo Credit: Special Tribunal for Lebanon via Flickr)

Editor’s Note: The atrocities of this latest and most violent Israeli war on Lebanon is bringing us new heights of depravity and many dystopian firsts, made possible by international infrastructures of intelligence gathering and infiltration. As part of our efforts to document these infrastructures and linkages, we turn here to the extent to which the international mechanisms set up to investigate Prime Minister Rafik Hariri´s assassination made available extensive, sensitive information about Lebanon to Israeli intelligence. The piece, originally published in Al-Akhbar on October 4, 2024, is authored by Omar Nashabe, an expert in criminal justice and human rights who has long tracked and analyzed the activities of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, serving also as a consultant for its Defense Counsels (2012-18).

Under the pretext of seeking the “truth” behind the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, Lebanese state institutions handed over extensive information about the country’s population, communications, transportation, and infrastructure to foreign investigators. 

In the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination, an international fact-finding mission, led by Irish police officer Peter FitzGerald, arrived in Beirut. 

Calls grew within Lebanon to grant the foreign investigator and his team unrestricted access and to disclose sensitive information, bypassing the agencies responsible for protecting the country from foreign intelligence intrusions, including the Army Intelligence Directorate, the State Security Directorate, and the General Directorate of General Security. 

FitzGerald even went so far as to demand the removal of the heads of these agencies, claiming they posed obstacles to the international investigation.

After one month of persistent efforts to extract sensitive information from Lebanese security services, FitzGerald submitted his report to the United Nations Security Council.

The Security Council then passed a resolution establishing the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), led by the controversial German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis. 

Mehlis swiftly acted on FitzGerald’s recommendations, leading to the arrests of General Security chief Maj. Gen. Jamil Sayyed; Internal Security Forces chief Maj. Gen. Ali Hage; head of Army Intelligence Brig. Gen. Raymond Azar; as well as Brig. Gen. Mustafa Hamdan, head of the army’s presidential guard.

As the UNIIIC had no powers of arrest, the Lebanese judiciary took on this role. 

Following the detentions, several foreign security and intelligence operatives working with the UNIIIC launched extensive information-gathering activities, targeting in particular Beirut’s southern suburbs as well as select areas in southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley. The identities and affiliations of these operatives remained beyond the scrutiny of Lebanese authorities.

Initially, the international investigation focused on suspicions of Syrian officers’ involvement in Hariri’s assassination.

In 2008, the German newspaper Der Spiegel leaked that Daniel Bellemare, the Canadian head of the UNIIIC and later prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), suspected individuals linked to Hezbollah in Hariri’s assassination. 

Following this revelation, the focus of foreign investigators shifted openly, as they concentrated their efforts on gathering information about Hezbollah’s leadership and members.

STL’s requests for information from state institutions became de facto orders under the successive governments of Saad Hariri and Fouad Siniora. These requests were framed as necessary for achieving justice, with warnings that any refusal could lead to civil strife.

Notably, STL’s Office of the Prosecutor engaged individuals such as Rita Katz, a former officer in the Israeli army, whose name was cited as a reference in the court’s ruling. It also contracted CIA agent Robert Baer, who was previously assigned to assassinate [Hezbollah military] leader Imad Mughniyeh.

Israeli intelligence launched a large-scale operation after the 2006 war, using STL as a tool that the Lebanese authorities could not block, allowing them to collect information that could later be used to locate Hezbollah leaders in preparation for their assassination.

Between 2008 and 2012, STL’s Office of the Prosecutor was able to gather the following information:

• Comprehensive communication data, including information about communication networks and GPS. This encompassed mobile and landline communications, as well as analyses that allowed investigators to determine the locations and movements of those communicating by phone. STL also collected all text messages, photos, numbers, addresses, and audio and video recordings from mobile phones.

• Full records from civil registry offices, detailing the identities of every Lebanese citizen, their family connections, births, deaths, addresses, and photos.

• Detailed information about neighborhoods, residential buildings, infrastructure, real estate, and maps sourced from real estate departments.

• Economic data from official departments, including information about businesses, companies, and individuals with registered commercial, industrial, or service interests.

• Records on bank transactions, including movements of accounts, funds transferred or deposited, their sources, and the individuals conducting financial transactions.

• Comprehensive data from the Vehicle Registration Department, covering all vehicles in Lebanon — cars, motorcycles, trucks — with details about models, chassis numbers, countries of origin, and shipping parties.

• Complete records on passenger movements through airports, land crossings, and ports, including travel dates and reservations.

• Information on students at the Lebanese University and private universities, including their identities, specializations, activities, relationships, opinions, affiliations, and political orientations.

Foreign investigators also accessed surveillance cameras on roads, in shops, schools, and residential apartments, and helped set up a surveillance network by installing cameras in key locations such as roads, public squares, the airport road, and other specific sites. Some cameras were openly placed, while others were hidden, especially around Beirut’s southern suburbs.

This extensive amount of information reached Israeli intelligence through the United States’ International Cooperation to Combat Terrorism initiative. While Israeli intelligence could have gathered much of this information through its agents in Lebanon or its advanced technological capabilities, obtaining it through the STL offered distinct advantages for Israel, including:

• Accessing information legally, without interference from the Lebanese government or any political or partisan group.

• Gathering all data comprehensively, without exception — including communications data of diplomats, lawyers, journalists, and others.

• Avoiding the manipulation of information, such as being misled by double agents or falling into planned traps designed to provide false information.

• Verifying the accuracy and validity of previously gathered information, allowing for a thorough analysis to reach specific conclusions.

There is no doubt that the intelligence collected by European, American, and Australian officers in Lebanon from 2008 to 2012 further enhanced the capabilities of Israeli intelligence. It enabled the Israeli military to identify Hezbollah’s military, security, political, and administrative leaders, as well as their associates, families, networks, movements, addresses, and activities.