Crossing the “Security Belt:” A History of the Occupied Lebanese Border Strip

Early Zionist Settlements and the Mandates

Despite nearly 100 years of political and military actions, the occupation has failed to gain control over what they call a “security belt” in South Lebanon, and to deliver the promised “protection” to settlers across the border. Every one of their attempts at occupation was met with resistance in various forms, borne from the southerners’ attachment to their land, which culminated in the occupation’s unconditional withdrawal, first in 2000, then in 2006. Popular resistance to colonial invasion returned in force in 2024, and it continues to this day, with the frontline villages’ heroic direct confrontations with the Israeli Occupying Forces (IOF).

In recent weeks, the enemy has announced its plans to establish once again a similar “buffer zone” in the South. As of the time of writing, it is deploying its entire military apparatus – supplemented by technological and logistical warfare – to take over towns such as Khiam or Kfar Kila, in an attempt to reoccupy the entire area from the border to the Litani River.

On the strategic role of al-Jalil and the Lebanese “security belt” in maintaining Zionist settlements, Ben-Gurion said:

“We must not assume that the Galilee is ours. We should not settle for a Galilee that is empty and desolate. We must settle the Galilee – Upper and Lower, East and West, or else it will amount to political defeat. We must create a chain of settlements along the border, up to Ras al-Naqoura, and to the outskirts of Safad as well. We must send there people – guides/instructors – who will organize the settlement. If said guides are serving in the forces, they must be discharged from their duties, because settlement has military value.”

The initial establishment of the border’s “security belt” was not a mere consequence of the 1978 invasion of the Litani. Rather, it was the result of nearly 30 years of repeated incursions into Lebanese territory between 1948 and 1978, and ongoing attempts to erode the resistance of the South with the aim of annexation. The goal of establishing a buffer zone in South Lebanon was a longstanding Zionist ambition. Between 1920 and 1948, disputes over the Lebanese-Palestinian border emerged between the British and the French. The demarcation of the border was subjected to the conflicting political commitments of the two mandating powers, namely, the Balfour Declaration and its promise to the Jews, the promise to Sharif Hussein and the Great Arab Revolt, and the promise to certain Christian factions in the creation of Greater Lebanon.

The lack of clearly defined borders contributed to the encroachment of territory under the French Mandate. France did not take a decisive stance against the Zionist entity’s expansionist project, which treated the borders of Palestine as their own. The Lebanese Constitution of May 23, 1926, reproduced this ambiguity, with Article 1 stating: “On the South: The present southern boundaries of the districts of Tyre and Marjeyoun.” The term “present” first appeared in the context of the “Palestine-Syria-Lebanon Agreement of Good Neighborly Relations” signed on February 2, 1926, by the mandating powers, which defined the borders according to the “Paulet-Newcombe Agreement.” Effectively, the agreement ceded a strip 3-5 kilometers wide from the borders of the French Mandate, which would then become those of the Lebanese state.

According to Mustafa Al-Dabbagh, the following villages and hamlets of the Sur district were ceded: Al-Bassa, Khirbet Ma’sub, Khirbet Ain Hour, Al-Jerdiya, Khirbet Samah, Tarbikha, Iqrit, Khirbet al-Sawana, and Hanita. Under ceded areas of the Marjeyoun district, Al-Dabbagh includes hamlets in the Isba’ al-Jalil (or Panhandle) region, an inhabited strip extending to the Hula Valley: Abil al-Qamh, Al-Sanbariyya, Al-Khisas, Al-Mansura, Al-Zuq al-Tahtani, Al-Zuq al-Fawqani, Al-Khalisa, Lazzaza, Qaytiyya, Al-Absiyya, Al-Na’ima, Al-Dawwara, Al-Salihiyya, Al-Zawiya, Salha, Al-Malkiyya, Qadas, Al-Nabi Yusha', Hunin, Al-Manara, Al-Manshiyya, Dafna, El Mutallah, Khan al-Duwayr, Talha, Jahula, Al-Shawka al-Tahta, Al-Buwaiziyya, Al-Miyyis, Kafr Bir’im.

Effectively, the agreement ceded a strip 3-5 kilometers wide from the borders of the French Mandate, which would then become those of the Lebanese state.

According to Palestinian historian Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, the following villages and hamlets of the Sour district were ceded: Al-Bassa, Khirbet Ma‘sub, Khirbet Ain Hour, Al-Jerdiya, Khirbet Samah, Tarbikha, Iqrit, Khirbet el-Sawana, and Hanita. Under the ceded areas of the Marjeyoun district, al-Dabbagh includes hamlets in the Isbaa al-Jalil, or Galilee Panhandle, region — an inhabited strip extending to the Hula Valley: Abil el-Qamh, Al-Sanbariyya, Al-Khisas, Al-Zuq el-Tahtani, Al-Zuq el-Fawqani, Al-Khalisa, Lazzaza, Qaytiyya, Al-‘Absiyya, Al-Na‘ima, Al-Dawwara, Al-Salihiyya, Al-Zawiya, Sabha, Al-Malikiyya, Qadas, Al-Nabi Yusha‘, Hunin, Al-Manara, Al-Manshiyya, Dafna, Al-Mtullah, Khan al-Duwayr, Salha, Jahula, Al-Shawka el-Tahta, Al-Buziyya, Al-Miyyis, and Kfar Bir‘im.3 

This early “security strip” held strategic military value for the Zionists, particularly because it comprises a series of highlands and hills inside occupied territory overlooking Lebanon's interior.

The significance of this seized region transcends its geographical size. Then, as now, it has occupied a prominent place in security, economic, and settlement planning of the (future) Israeli entity. While it fulfills only a fraction of the Zionist movement’s ambitions, it is seen as a stepping stone towards reinforcing northern borders. This area, which includes 39 occupied villages and farms according to Dabbagh, delineated the armistice line with Lebanon, becoming the northern border of Palestine. This early “security strip” held strategic military value for the Zionists, particularly because it comprises a series of highlands and hills inside occupied territory overlooking Lebanon's interior.

The following high points contributed to this strategic position: 

• The heights of al-Manara (950 m)
• Misgav Am (910 m)
• Jabal ‘Adather, south of Rmeish (1,006 m)
• The al-Raheb citadel in the Aita al-Shaab area (731 m)
• The interconnected mountain range along the border, from al-Mtullah (“Metula” settlement) (525 m) to Tarbikha
• Al-Malikiyya (890 m)
• The heights of Isbaa al-Jalil (Galilee Panhandle), an extension of the Jabal el-Sheikh mountain range

The British mandatory authorities recognized the military importance of the Galilee and established military barracks across the area, commonly known as “camps:” Camp Yusha‘, Camp Salha, Camp Sa‘sa‘, and Camp Nimr 1 near al-Bassa. Constructed as military towers resembling medieval castles, the camps were built in strategic locations to control vast swaths of the hills and crossings between British- and French-mandated territories.

Similarly, Zionist strategists recognized the importance of the area early on. They began building settlements along what would become the mandate line, decades before the establishment of the Zionist entity. For instance, the settlement of “Metula” (al-Mtullah) was founded on May 19, 1896, by Jewish financier Baron Edmond de Rothschild, who invested over half a million French francs on the settler project. Its organized layout drew the attention of travelers who visited after its establishment. Al-Mtullah overlooks the Houla Valley; its name, meaning “the lookout,” is derived from its elevated position.

Following the 1949 Armistice Agreement, the Israeli regime consolidated its control over territory beyond the mandated border zone. In early November 1948, a battalion of the Carmeli Brigade crossed the border and invaded 17 Lebanese villages west of al-Manara road, with its forces reaching Wadi Duba, west of Houla. Local oral histories indicate that the villages and towns occupied by the Israeli forces in 1948 were Rmeish, Yaroun, Aitaroun, Blida, Mhaibib, Mays al-Jabal, Houla, Markaba, Odaisseh, Kfar Kila, Deir Mimas, Tallousa, Bani Hayyan, Rab el-Thalathin, Taybeh, Deir Siryan, and Alman.

The Occupied Border Strip After the 1978 Invasion

From 1978 to 1982, the Israeli-occupied strip covered approximately 700 square kilometers, stretching 80 to 85 kilometers in length and four to 12 kilometers in width. The area was defined for so-called security purposes. In the first week of the ceasefire, Saad Haddad, founding commander of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), began establishing recruitment camps in the strip and checking residents’ IDs to determine their “loyalties.”

Haddad was an instrumental ally in Israel’s involvement in the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990). On April 18, 1979, at 5:20 p.m., he declared the founding of the “State of Free Lebanon” at a press conference held in the settlement of Metula. He also announced that the borders of his “state” were those of Lebanon and that its capital would be Beirut. In practice, the borders of that “state” remained confined to the occupied border strip.

This political position, or in other words the new political status quo, fed into a revived Zionist vision articulated by Israel’s then minister of defense, Shimon Peres, in remarks on June 24, 1976: “South Lebanon, located along the Israeli border, is in a military and political vacuum.”

As of August 1978, the Zionist entity began distributing “temporary Identification” cards. Stripping away Lebanese identification and replacing it with that of the “State of Free Lebanon” became a condition for remaining in the area and a sword that hung over the southerners’ necks until mid-1985.

As of August 1978, the Zionist entity began distributing “temporary Identification” cards. The cover of the card stated that the document would remain “valid until life returns to normal” and warned that anyone not carrying it would be subject to arrest and interrogation at the Eastern Sector Command. Stripping away Lebanese identification and replacing it with that of the “State of Free Lebanon” became a condition for remaining in the area and a sword that hung over the southerners’ necks until mid-1985.

The “State of Free Lebanon” also attempted to replace Lebanese passports with ones bearing its name. It abolished Lebanese Independence Day on November 22, 1943, along with all associated celebrations and school holidays, replacing it with April 18, 1979 — the date of its declaration.

The occupying forces required vehicles circulating in the occupied border strip to display Israeli license plates as a means of tracking and identification. Registration centers for vehicles owned by residents of the “security belt” were established in Bint Jbeil and the outskirts of al-Malikiyya.

The Second Stage of the Border Strip’s Occupation

The Zionist enemy’s partial withdrawal from south Lebanon, on June 10, 1985, resulted in Israel’s retention of an occupied strip of about 79 kilometers in length along the Lebanese-Palestinian border, extending to Ras al-Naqoura along the coast. With the addition of areas along the Lebanese-Syrian border that Israel occupied during the 1967 and 1973 wars in the highlands of Jabal el-Sheikh, the total length of the occupied strip in southern Lebanon reached around 122 kilometers. 

The occupied strip averaged roughly 10 kilometers in width, varying across Lebanese territory to a minimum of five kilometers. The area of the occupied strip was therefore approximately 1,200 square kilometers, equivalent to about 12 percent of Lebanon’s territory as defined by its state borders.

Seventy-one villages were occupied along the border strip, distributed as follows:

1. Saida District: one village (Bouslaiya)
2. Sour District: 11 villages out of 96 in the district
3. Bint Jbeil District: 18 villages out of 26
4. Marjeyoun District: 26 villages out of 30
5. Hasbaya District: 16 villages out of 21, in addition to the 14 farms in Shebaa. Bastara, the last of Shebaa Farms, was occupied in 1990
6. Nabatieh District: two villages (Arnoun and Yohmor), in addition to the Ali Taher heights and the protected areas of Arnoun
7. Jezzine District: 47 towns and villages

Crossings and Checkpoints

The occupying entity controlled and restricted movement in the strip through a network of “crossings” that partitioned the land. A crossing (or ma‘bar) typically consists of transport infrastructure connecting one region to another, like a bridge, tunnel, or highway. The occupation chose strategic crossings to establish checkpoints and divide the South into sectors. It seized 11 sites, six of them permanent and five temporary or mobile:

1. Hamra-Al-Bayada Bridge Ma‘bar
   A coastal crossing intended primarily for residents of the western sector south of the Litani. The bridge was also used in exceptional cases by central sector residents in the event that their own Ma‘bar Beit Yahoun was closed.
2. Ma‘bar Beit Yahoun
   This crossing connected the central sector with villages in the eastern sector of Marjeyoun, extending to the town of Odaisseh.
3. Ma‘bar Kfar Tebnit
   Located east of Kfar Tebnit in the direction of the Khardali Bridge, this crossing was closed on July 15, 1985, following a resistance operation. It remained closed until May 25, 1987, when it was reopened to allow passage to villages in Marjeyoun, three villages in the Jezzine district (al-Aishiyah, Rihan, and Aaramta), and neighboring farms.
4. Ma‘bar Zamriya-Marj el-Zhour
   Located 500 meters northeast of the Hasbani Bridge, it was used by villages, towns, and farms of Hasbaya.
5. Ma‘bar Bater-Jezzine
   Considered among the most famous crossings among southerners. In early September 1983, shortly after withdrawing from the Chouf mountains, the Zionist entity closed the Awali crossing, making the Bater-Jezzine crossing the sole entry point to the South until its withdrawal from Saida on February 16, 1985. Afterward, the crossing returned to serving the Jezzine district, while also allowing Druze residents from Hasbaya to travel to the Chouf. Unlike other crossings, it remained open to vehicles that retained Lebanese license plates.
6. Ma‘bar Bisri
   Considered the second gateway to Jezzine after Bater. It was open to pedestrians in both directions and to trucks transporting sand to the Siblin Cement Factory in the Iqlim al-Kharrub region.
7. Ma‘bar Rihan-Kfarhouna
   Granting passage to and from the occupied strip, the Rihan-Kfarhouna crossing was used as an additional security checkpoint, after passing through Bater-Jezzine’s. In 1996, the Israeli occupation established a main gate in the Kfarhouna-Mashghara-Aaramta triangle, connected to secondary sub-gates in the area, which were used for additional security screenings before reaching the main gate.
8. Ma‘bar Al-Shumariyah-Alman
   Located near the Qa‘qaiya Bridge, the crossing was closed in the winter of 1986.
9. Ma‘bar Chaqra-Houla
   The occupation opened the Chaqra-Houla checkpoint in late 1986 following the closure of al-Shumariyah’s, but it was closed again on December 18, 1987.
10. Ma‘bar Rimat
    Located near Rimat, the crossing was open in both directions but limited to a small number of faculty at the Saidoun National School and to students from Barti and Wadi el-Laymoun who are enrolled in Deir Mashmoushe. Upon arrival, students and faculty disembarked from a school bus, crossed the checkpoint on foot, and boarded a second bus waiting for them on the other side. They were the only group permitted to use this crossing.
11. Ma‘bar Arnoun-Yohmor
    Open to residents of both towns, the Arnoun-Yohmor checkpoint was frequently closed and reopened, depending on the siege imposed on the two towns, sometimes lasting several months.

A physical manifestation of the occupation, the checkpoints altered the material conditions across the border strip, according to testimonies by locals who had to traverse them. Many southerners became reluctant to visit their villages and would only make seasonal trips for occasions such as celebrations or funerals due to the securitized landscape. The architecture of the crossings was generally similar, both in terms of external structure and internal function.

In terms of physical structure, most checkpoints were strategically positioned on naturally elevated ground. They were surrounded by Israeli or SLA military positions on adjacent hilltops, only hundreds of meters away, keeping the checkpoint within a direct line of sight.

The internal configuration of the checkpoints consisted of a main gate leading to two or three internal gates. Once inside, travelers were led to interrogation rooms or search areas where their belongings and vehicles were inspected. The distance between entry and exit points formed was known as the “central control zone.”

The architecture and operation of the crossings changed significantly over the years of the occupation: from simple crossings to heavily militarized sites, with watchtowers, high, winding earthen berms, and complex entry systems.

The crossings also shared a common operating mechanism, which depended on the “security” conditions of the moment. In some cases, drivers were ordered via loudspeakers from the observation posts to exit their vehicles and open the outer gate themselves. All crossings also required residents to acquire “crossing permits” to leave the occupied territory. The permits specified a period of validity and were issued by various sources, including security apparatuses, Israeli or SLA centers, and local civil administrations.

The architecture and operation of the crossings changed significantly over the years of the occupation. Initially, they were simple crossings. In the final years before the liberation of the South in 2000, they had become heavily militarized sites — with watchtowers, high, winding earthen berms, and complex entry systems. A traveler would disappear from sight just a few meters after entering. The crossings’ mechanisms of operation also changed to include multiple layers of surveillance, interrogation, and inspection. Travelers were then condemned to the securitized labyrinth. To emerge from the other side, travelers had to walk out on paths of up to 1,000 meters on foot; neither the ill nor the elderly were spared. 

Operating Hours of the Checkpoints

The crossings operated during daylight hours, from 8 or 9 a.m. to 3 or 4 p.m., from Monday to Thursday. They closed early on Fridays, between 11 a.m. and 12 p.m., and were closed on Saturdays. These hours remained nominal, however, and were contingent on security conditions at individual crossings and across the occupied strip. They were also subject to the imperatives of the occupation forces and their acolytes, the flow of money and bribes, individual whims, military activity by local militias, in addition to Lebanese holidays and their equivalent on the Israeli side.

In some cases, crossings opened only once during the day, just a few minutes before the end of the official working hours at 4 p.m.

Crossings could remain closed for days. At times, amid rumors of imminent reopening, travelers would wait for hours on end. Confusion among travelers prevailed with the repeated opening and closing of a crossing multiple times a day, without prior warning, arrangement, or justification. In some cases, crossings opened only once during the day, just a few minutes before the end of the official working hours at 4 p.m.

In all cases, those crossing had to exercise the utmost patience and endurance under conditions of anxiety and uncertainty, punctuated by the sound of tanks’ rumbling engines as soldiers switched military posts, or the armed men’s aimless gunfire, which at times proved fatal. Travelers brought provisions to prepare for the long wait at the gates, and, most of all, the resolve needed to withstand an unbearable situation. Crossing to and from the border strip became a degrading ordeal — a humiliation ritual deliberately inflicted by the enemy.

Security at the Checkpoints: Collaborators and Bribes

The opening of a crossing gate did not guarantee passage. In many cases, crossing was facilitated by the khuwwa, an imposed bribe. Paying this khuwwa could secure expedited crossing, allow expired permits to be overlooked, reduce inspection of goods, or permit vehicles to enter and exit the South.

There were no fixed limits on the amounts paid, and in some cases, advance payments were accepted to cover several trips. For many locals, the khuwwa was the most effective means to preserve their dignity.

The Israeli strategy relied on perpetual friction among local actors, who were deployed across villages and crossings under the command of Lahd’s SLA.

The crossings were administered by local “custodians” of the border villages, who were affiliated with Israeli security agencies. The Israeli strategy at the time relied on perpetual friction among these local actors, who, under the command of Lahd’s SLA, were deployed across villages and crossings.

With the backing of the occupation, a custodian at a checkpoint could single out residents crossing from a village whose officials they were at odds with. Those residents could then be subjected to harassment, excessive searches, and interrogation. Conversely, good relations with village officials could facilitate passage, making their movement to and from the strip less arduous. This, however, did not exempt them from the khuwwa, which was often paid in their villages — either in material goods or through social gestures, such as endorsing officials.

The Ground Invasion and the “Frontline” Edge

In the context of the historical Zionist territorial ambitions, it is no surprise that the Israeli occupation is taking steps towards a ground invasion of south Lebanon today. The objective appears to be the establishment of a “buffer zone” extending to the Litani River. This would involve the depopulation of frontline villages, many of which have been destroyed in the 2024 war, including during the so-called ceasefire, and continue to come under attack to this day. This differs from the period between 1978 and 2000, when these areas were still inhabited by some of their residents who had stayed in their villages throughout the occupation.

Israel’s scorched-earth policy is not new: many villages on the Palestinian side of the border were completely obliterated during the 1948 war. At the time, destruction ravaged some southern villages, and areas of Isba’ al-Jalil, extending from the Lebanese border reaching as far as the Syrian border in the east.

This strategy was linked to resistance encountered in those villages, including from the Salvation Army and the local Palestinian resistance groups. The battle of Camp Yusha‘, for instance, resulted in 28 casualties among Zionist forces attempting to occupy the village, and was one of the rare occasions where the occupation disclosed the extent of their losses.

The enemy’s policy of erasure is, then, a direct result of the act of resistance: the louder the voice of resistance, the harsher the policy — as we see today.  

The difference today is in how the resistance describes the battle. Resistance fighters in Lebanon possess a legacy of steadfastness, an unbroken will to fight, and a more coherent operational capacity. This organized fighting emerges from beneath the rubble of south Lebanon's occupied villages. It follows a 15-month “truce” during which the enemy persisted in erasing these villages — bombarding them, booby-trapping them, and occupying strategic hilltops such as Tallet al-Hamames and Blat.

Today, key questions remain: Will this historical threat become a reality? Will the border strip be reclaimed as a “buffer zone” extending to the Litani River? And, if so, would this area become depopulated?

Today, key questions remain: Will this historical threat become a reality? Will the border strip be reclaimed as a “buffer zone” extending to the Litani River? And, if so, would this area become depopulated?

What is clear is that the land of southern Lebanon has been, and continues to be, Zionism’s expansionist testing ground within Lebanon. Here, the genocidal entity has experimented with various forms of control: direct and indirect, including the use of local proxies and collaborators. And now, in light of the U.S. President Trump’s talk of an “economic zone,” we may even see a new face of colonialism.

It should be remembered that the “security” invoked by the Zionist entity is nothing more than a pretext — a justification framework based on the claim of “Israel’s right to defend itself.” Its ambitions are no secret — from Gaza to the West Bank, from the Jordan Valley to the Golan Heights, from Shebaa Farms to south Lebanon and beyond. 

The occupier deceives no one. And we will continue to resist.